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PARTIES 
The Children: 
S. H., born July 30, 1985. She is the seventeen year-
old daughter of the Appellant. 
R.D., born September 9, 1988. She is the fourteen 
year-old daughter of the Appellant 
T.D., born November 23, 1990. He is the twelve year-
old son of the Appellant. 
P.D., born April 14, 1994. He is the nine year-old son 
of the Appellant. 
The Parent: 
L.D., "the Mother." She is the Mother of the above 
Children She is appealing the termination of her parental 
rights. 
The Agencies: 
Division of Child and Family Services, "the 
Division" or "DCFS." The Division was the petitioner 
below and is the appellee in the present case. 
Office of the Guardian ad Litem, "the Guardian." 
The juvenile court appointed the Guardian to represent the 
best interests of the minor children. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the interest of 
S.H., R.D., T.D., & P.D., 
Children under eighteen 
years of age. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee, 
v. 
L.D., 
Appellant. 
CaseNo.20030191-CA 
Priority No. 4 
GUARDIAN ad LITEM'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(c) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-909. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the 2002 Amendments apply to the petition. This is an issue of law 
which this Court reviews for correctness. In re T.M., 2003 UT App 191, f 20. 
2. Whether an appellant may raise a claim on appeal when the appellant has 
waived that claim. Absent plain error, this Court has declined to consider claims that 
have not been preserved. In re T.M.. 2003 UT App 191, If 24 n.4; Hart v. Salt Lake Co. 
Comm'n. 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah App. 1997). 
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STATUTES, RULES, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of Case: The Mother appeals an order terminating her parental rights. 
Course of Proceedings: The Children were removed twice. First in 1997 and then 
in May of 2001. R.12, 26-29. In March 2002, the Division petitioned to terminate her 
parental rights. R.77-83. After four days of trial on the merits, the juvenile court 
convened with parties in chambers and announced a stipulated agreement. Pursuant to 
the agreement, the Mother entered admissions on the record to each allegation in the 
petition that related to her. The court then deferred entering the admissions pending an 
additional sixty days of services to the Mother. The court provided in the event that the 
Mother failed to comply with services, any party could move the court to enter her 
admissions. R.259-66, September 29, 2002 tr. 631-45, R.340. See Appendix A. 
Pursuant to the Guardian ad Litem's motion, the juvenile court convened a hearing 
in December 2002 to hear evidence to determine whether it should enter the Mother's 
admission to the termination petition. 
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Disposition at Trial: After an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the court found the 
evidence to be sufficient to determine the Mother had not complied with the terms of the 
agreement. The court then entered the Mother's admissions to the termination petition. 
December 23, 2002 tr. 65-69, R.336. See Appendix B. R.322-31. The Mother appeals 
the termination order. R.332. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case involves the stability and welfare of four Children, ages seventeen, 
fourteen, twelve and nine. They have been twice removed from the Mother. The Mother 
was criminally convicted once for abuse of the oldest child and once for abuse of the 
child who is now twelve. R.3-6, 27. 
In May 2001, when the Mother was on probation for two earlier convictions of 
criminal child abuse, she was seen battering the ten year-old in public. R.27. The 
Children were placed in the custody of the Division, but the order was stayed on a day-to-
day basis and the Children were returned to the Mother. R.26-29, 43. The juvenile court 
adjudicated a neglect and abuse petition against the Mother. R.61-62, Appendix A. at 
634. Two months later, the Mother's probation was revoked, and the juvenile court lifted 
its stay and the Children were again removed from the Mother's care while she served 60 
days of a 365-day sentence. R.64-66. 
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By September 2001, the Mother was out of jail and resumed accumulating 
referrals and substantiations for child abuse. R.67, Appendix at 634. The Mother was 
held in contempt of court and was sentenced to jail for five days. R.70. 
The Mother's probation was again revoked and she was ordered to serve the 
remainder of the sentence for violating a no contact order in place to protect the Children. 
Appendix A. at 635. In February of 2002, the juvenile court terminated reunification 
services. R.75-76. In March 2002, the Division petitioned to terminate the Mother's 
parental rights. R.77-83. 
After four days of trial on the merits, the juvenile court met with all parties in 
chambers. The court announced on the record that the parties had "reluctantly" come to a 
stipulated settlement. Appendix at 631-45. 
As part of the settlement, the Mother admitted on the record to each paragraph of 
the petition that pertained to her. The Mother admitted to grounds for termination, 
reasonable efforts by the Division, and best interests. 
The Mother admitted that "the state has attempted to provide you with numerous 
reunification services since the adjudication of the shelter petition on the children. The 
State has provided you with a DCFS caseworker, service plans, a psychological 
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examination, referrals for treatment, therapeutic visitation, appointed legal counsel." 
Appendix A at 636. The Mother admitted that she had failed to comply with these 
services. Id. 
The court then asked the Mother what would happen if she didn't comply with the 
treatment plan. The Mother responded: "I will lose my family." Id. at 638. "For how 
long?" the court asked. "For the rest of my life." Id. The court emphasized, "it is 
important that you understand that there won't be another trial, there won't be another 
review of all the evidence." Id. at 639. 
The juvenile court then deferred entering the Mother's admission for sixty days 
while the Mother would be required to comply with a service plan. The Mother's 
noncompliance would result in the court entering her admissions to the termination 
petition. 
When the Mother demonstrated noncompliance with every aspect of the plan, the 
Guardian ad Litem moved the court for an evidentiary hearing on the question of whether 
the court should enter the Mother's admission to the termination petition. R.286-89. 
After an evidentiary hearing on the motion, the court ruled from the bench finding the 
Mother did not comply with the terms of the treatment plan. Therefore it was appropriate 
to enter her admission to the termination petition. Appendix B at 65-69. 
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At the hearing, the juvenile court conceded that its purpose in deferring admission 
of the Mother's earlier admissions to the petition was not entirely focused on the 
Children's best interests: 
The concern that the Court had during the prior 
adjudication was not so much the best interests as it pertains 
to the children as it was the fact that the mother had only been 
in jail for a short period of time and I wasn't sure she'd had a 
fair shot at being able to comply with the service plan. 
Id. at 65. 
The court noted that, at the earlier termination hearing, it had interviewed the 
Children and that "none of the children expressed to the Court a desire to return home 
under the current circumstances, with the mother functioning the way that she was." The 
court found that the Children "had been abused emotionally, and were in a very sad and 
very deplorable and neglectful condition, in terms of their anxieties and their emotional 
stress. . . . The Court also found that the children had thrived in foster care." Id. at 66. 
The court also noted that the Mother had had almost twice the sixty-day time limit 
that had been contemplated. Id. The court then concluded that the Mother had failed in 
"every regard" of the treatment plan. Id. at 66-67. The court then accepted and entered 
the Mother's admission to the termination petition. Id. at 68-69. The court entered 
written findings and order to the effect. R.322-31. The Mother appeals the termination 
order. R.332. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Mother, having on the record and upon the advice of counsel, entered her 
admission to the termination petition. Included in her admission were admissions going 
to grounds, best interests and the Division's efforts to provide her with services. The 
Mother also agreed to the terms of the sixty-day extension of services. 
Given those admissions, the Mother has waived all claims going to reasonable 
efforts. She has also waived all claims going to the juvenile court's power to enter her 
admissions and to terminate her parental rights. 
Moreover, the Mother enjoyed an additional four months of services to which she 
was not legally entitled. 
This Court should therefore affirm the termination order. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE 2002 AMENDMENTS DO NOT APPLY TO THE PETITION. 
The Mother claims that the 2002 amendment to section 78-3a-407, requiring 
terminating courts to find reasonable efforts by the Division, applies to the present 
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petition even though* the petition was filed prior to the effective date of the statute. See 
Mother's Brief at 15-20. 
The Legislature amended section 78-3a-407 such that a terminating court, prior to 
terminating a parents' rights on specified grounds, must make findings going to 
reasonable efforts, where services had earlier been ordered. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-
407. This Courl has held that the amendment is not retroactive and applies only to those 
termination petitions filed after May 6, 2002, the effective date of the statute. In re TJVL 
2003 UTApp 191,1[ 20. 
The Mother concedes this point, see Mother's Brief at 15, but claims that 
services ordered after the effect date of the statute somehow constituted a new petition 
and, therefore, the 2002 amendment applies. Id. at 18 ("The trial court then commenced 
a new action by ordering DCFS to provide a sixty (60) day service plan to Appellant."). 
This claim ignores the fact that no new termination petition was filed after the effective 
date of the amendment. 
Moreover, much of the Mother's argument centers on the legality of the trial 
court's extension of reunification services after grounds were established. The juvenile 
court's extension of services, after grounds were found and after twelve months had 
elapsed since removal, was legally unwarranted. In a case involving the same juvenile 
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judge, this Court emphasized that "our juvenile courts lack the authority to stay an order 
terminating a parents' rights, and that such a stay is contrary to the stated goals of our 
child welfare laws." InreSJU 1999 UT App 390, If 40, 995 P.2d 17. 
In SJL, the juvenile court had entered the termination order and had stayed on a 
day-to-day basis while the Mother received reunification services. In the present case, 
the same juvenile judge court accepted the Mother's admission to the petition (including 
admissions going to best interests), but stayed entry of the admissions for a sixty-day 
period while the Mother received reunification services. Appendix A at 637-38. 
In the present case, the Children were removed July 16, 2001. R.64. Thus, the 
Children were entitled to permanency and the Mother was disentitled to any services after 
July 16, 2002. On September 29, 2002, fourteen months after the Children's removal, the 
juvenile court extended reunification services by another sixty days. The Mother, having 
received the benefit of the court's extra-legal extension of services, cannot not claim that 
the court entered a "new" action and thus she is entitled to yet another finding of 
reasonable efforts. 
Finally, the Mother stipulated to a finding going to reasonable efforts. That is, on 
September 29, 2002, the date the Mother stipulated to the termination petition, the 
Mother admitted on the record that "the State has attempted to provide you with 
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numerous reunification services since the adjudication of the shelter petition on the 
children. The State has provided you with a DCFS caseworker, service plans, a 
psychological examination, referrals for treatment, therapeutic visitation, appointed legal 
counsel." Appendix A at 636. 
In short, Ihe Mother's claim has no merit because the termination petition was 
filed prior the effective date of the 2002 amendment and because the Mother stipulated to 
a finding going to reasonable efforts and because the Division's efforts went beyond 
reason, because they extended beyond the twelve-month period allowable under the law. 
For these reasons, this Court should affirm the termination order. 
2. THE MOTHER HAS WAIVED ALL CLAIMS 
ARISING FROM THE TERMINATION ORDER. 
The Mother claims the juvenile court was without discretion to enter the 
termination order based on her performance of the sixty-day service plan that was put in 
place after she admitted to the petition. See Mother's Brief at 21-26. 
This Court has previously declined to consider whether a stipulated agreement, 
similar to the present one, might be invalid as a matter of law where the parents did not 
preserve the issue. In re T.M.. 2003 UT App 191, Tf 24 n.4. 
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Here, the Mother admitted to every aspect of the termination petition including 
grounds, best interests, and reasonable efforts. Appendix at 631-45. Moreover, in the 
December 2002 hearing to determine whether the court should enter the Mother's 
admissions, the Mother never raised the issue that the court had no discretion to 
termination her rights. Counsel for Mother asked only for leave to continue on the 
service plan. Appendix B at 65. 
This Court should decline to consider the Mother's claim because she waived it 
when she admitted to the termination petition and because she never preserved it for 
appeal. See Hart v. Salt Lake Co. Comm'n. 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah App. 1997). 
This Court should therefore affirm the termination order. 
3. THE JUVENILE COURT FOUND REASONABLE EFFORTS. 
The Mother claims the juvenile court failed to find that the Division made 
reasonable efforts at the time it entered the termination order. See Mother's Brief at 26-
29. 
As addressed above, the 2002 amendment did not apply to the termination petition 
because the petition was filed prior to the effective date of the amendment. As addressed 
above, the Mother stipulated to the fact that the Division provided reasonable services. 
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Appendix A at 636. Finally, at the December 23, 2002 hearing to determine whether the 
Court should enter the Mother's admission to the termination petition, counsel for Mother 
never objected to the nature of the services, nor did he argue that services were not 
reasonable. Instead, he said he was "simply asking this Court to allow my client to 
continue on the service plan." Appendix B at 65. 
Given the Mother's admissions, she has waived any claim going to the reasonable 
of services, even if the statute did apply, which it did not. See Hart v. Salt Lake Co. 
Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah App. 1997) (absent plain error, a party must preserve 
a claim for this Court to consider it on appeal). This Court should therefore affirm the 
termination order. 
ORAL ARGUMENT: PUBLICATION OF OPINION 
The Guardian ad Litem does not request oral argument or a published opinion 
because the Mother raises no issues of merit. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Guardian moves this court to affirm the juvenile 
court's termination order. 
DATED this 22nd day of July 2003. 
MARTHA PIERCE V . 
Guardian ad Litem 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of July 2003,1 caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, two true and exact copies of the Guardian ad Litem's Brief to: 
John M. Peterson 
Carol L.C. Verdoia 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Gary L. Bell 
254 West 400 South, Suite 320 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
MARTHA PIERCE 
Guardian ad Litem 
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APPENDIX 
A. Transcript of Admission to Termination Petition. September 29, 2002, R.340, 
Tr.631-45. 
B. Transcript of Entry of Admission. December 23, 2002, R.336, Tr.65-69. 
20030191-CA 14 
APPENDIX A 
September 29, 2002 Transcript. R. 340, Tr.631-45. 
1 THE COURT: Let me see counsel in chambers. 
2 I (A brief recess.) 
3 (Proceedings resume at 3:50 p.m.) 
4 THE BAILIFF: Back on the record in the 
5 Hartwell-DeLong children. 
6 THE COURT: Well, we appreciate everybodyfs patience, 
7 J the record should reflect that theref s been an extensive 
8 conference in chambers between all of the attorneys and I think 
9 we've arrived at an alternative disposition which doesn't make 
10 everybody happy, but I think that everybody has agreed that it 
11 is a — an acceptable way to proceed. Though each person has 
12 reservations, I think they feel like it will meet the ultimate 
13 I needs and the best interests of the children. And the Court is 
14 J in agreement that this is probably a solution to a very 
15 difficult situation that will in the long run meet the 
16 interests of the children, regardless of how it comes out. 
17 Mr. Angley, you were going to discuss with your 
18 client her willingness to admit the petition today. In 
19 exchange for which, if she did admit the petition, that she 
20 would be given approximately 60 days to demonstrate 100 percent 
21 compliance with the service plan to be drafted by the Division 
22 of Family Services. That arrangement is based on your 
23 I understanding, and Ifm sure your representation to her is based 
24 I on the evidence I thought there might be grounds to terminate 
25 I her parental rights. But based on best interests of the 
1 
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children, I was more concerned about whether that was in their 
best interest at this point based on their comments. 
Also I was concerned that she had been in jail 
before. She *s only been out for a very brief period of time, 
eight months in jail, three weeks out of jail. And that this 
would give me an opportunity to see if she was genuinely 
sincere about the changes she says she has made. And if she's 
genuinely benefited from all the classes that she took while 
she was in jail. Is that your understanding, sir? 
MR. ANGLEY: That is, your Honor. And that is what I 
represented to my client. 
THE COURT: Would you be kind enough to do a Boiken 
with her then on the petition and process her admission. 
MR. ANGLEY: Sure. Where is it? 
Ms. DeLong, you have gone over the petition to 
terminate your parental rights with me? 
THE COURT: Ms. DeLong, pull that microphone up real 
close to you. And, ma'am, would you speak up big and loud for 
us so we will pick it up. You have kind of a soft voice and I 
want to make sure we get everything you say. 
MS. DeLONG: Okay. 
MR. ANGLEY: You have gone over this verified 
petition for termination of parental rights with me? 
MS. DeLONG: Yes, I have. 
MR. ANGLEY: Okay. And first of all, you are not 
1 under the influence of any drugs or alcohol or anything that 
2 would impair your thinking today? 
3 MS. DeLONG: No, Ifm not. 
4 1 MR. ANGLEY: Okay. And you know that you have the 
5 right — we have started a trial in this petition, you have the 
6 J right to continue this trial and conclude the trial and submit 
7 this to the judge for a decision, correct? 
8 MS. DeLONG: Yes. 
9 MR. ANGLEY: And that includes your right to present 
10 witnesses, which we have done, cross-examine witnesses, testify 
11 on your own behalf, or refuse to do so. You have testified on 
12 your own behalf in this case? 
13 MS. DeLONG: I have. 
14 I MR. ANGLEY: And if you admitted the petition, as 
15 we're doing right now, you are waiving any further rights you 
16 have to a trial on this petition, correct? 
17 MS. DeLONG: Yes. 
18 I MR. ANGLEY: Okay. As far as this petition goes, Ifm 
19 going to walk through it with you and I want you to indicate 
20 whether you admit the individual allegations in this petition. 
21 J Paragraph 1, that this Court does have jurisdiction 
22 I and venue is proper given that you and the children reside in 
23 I Salt Lake County. Do you admit that? 
24 MS. DeLONG: Yes. 
25 MR. ANGLEY: Paragraph 2, Sara Hartwell, Rebecca 
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DeLong, Taylor DeLong, and Phillip DeLong are in the custody of 
the Division and are the natural children of yourself? 
MS. DeLONG: Yes. 
MR. ANGLEY: You admit that? Please say the word 
admit. 
MS. DeLONG: I admit that. 
MR. ANGLEY: Paragraph 3, Taylor DeLong adjudicated 
as an abused child and Phillip, Rebecca and Sara adjudicated as 
neglected on July 3 r d' 2001. 
MS. DeLONG: I admit that. 
MR. ANGLEY: Four, these children have been in the 
custody and guardianship of the Division since July 16th, 2001 
due to the incarceration of yourself following your criminal 
conviction for physically abusing Taylor. You served 60 days 
of a one-year sentence and were released on probation. Do you 
admit that? 
MS. DeLONG: I admit that. 
MR. ANGLEY: Paragraph 5, you have failed to comply 
with either the criminal court's orders regarding contact with 
the children or this Court's records regarding visitation and 
contact with your children. You have consistently attempted 
contact with the children outside the boundaries set forth for 
your visitation. Do you admit that? 
MS. DeLONG: I admit that. 
MR. ANGLEY: Six, Taylor has required hospitalization 
1 due to his fragile emotional state. Taylor's condition has 
2 been exacerbated by contact with yourself. You have repeatedly 
3 ignored orders not to attempt contact directly with Taylor. In 
4 December 2001 you ignored DCFS and Taylorfs therapist's 
5 directives not to contact or attempt to contact Taylor and made 
6 J repeated telephone calls to Taylor at Primary Children's 
7 J residential unit. Taylor's response to these calls was to 
8 start cutting on himself and an attempt to hang himself. The 
9 J calls stopped — the calls stopped when you were arrested. Do 
10 I you admit that? 
11 MS. DeLONG: Yes, I admit that. 
12 MR. ANGLEY: In January 2002, Judge Christiansen 
13 revoked your probation for your violation of the no contact 
14 order and imposed 305 days left of your jail sentence. Do you 
15 admit that? 
16 MS. DeLONG: Yes, I admit that. 
17 MR. ANGLEY: Paragraph 8, the children are doing 
18 I better in their placements without contact from you? Do you 
19 admit that? 
20 MS. DeLONG: I admit that. 
21 I MR. ANGLEY: Nine, according to your psychological 
22 J evaluation, you have no insight into your behavior and present 
23 J a physical and emotional risk to your children. Do you admit 
24 that? 
25 MS. DeLONG: I admit that. 
1 MR. ANGLEY: Paragraph 10 does not apply to you. 
2 Paragraph 11 does not apply to you. 
3 Paragraph 12, the State has attempted to provide you 
4 with numerous reunification services since the adjudication of 
5 the shelter petition on the children. The State has provided 
6 you with a DCFS caseworker, service plans, a psychological 
7 I examination, referrals for treatment, therapeutic visitation, 
8 appointed legal counsel. Do you admit that? 
9 MS. DeLONG: I admit that. 
10 MR. ANGLEY: Thirteen, you have failed to comply with 
11 J the terms of your service plan and failed to comply with the 
12 I terms of your probation. Do you admit that? 
13 MS. DeLONG: I admit that. 
14 MR. ANGLEY: Fourteen, and final paragraph, Sara is 
15 I in Odyssey House and the other children are placed in separate 
16 placements where their special needs are being met. The 
17 children all have appropriate contact with each other and their 
18 J behaviors have improved. It is in the best interest of the 
19 children to maintain this arrangement inasmuch as there were no 
20 suitcible relative placements available to take the children as 
21 la sibling group. Do you admit that? 
22 MS. DeLONG: Yes, I admit that. 
23 MR. ANGLEY: Fourteen, that's the entirety of the 
24 J petition. 
25 THE COURT: Ms. DeLong, I want to talk to you just a 
1 little bit on the record now. 
2 MS. DeLONG: Okay. 
3 THE COURT: Do you understand, ma'am, that by 
4 admitting the petition the Court does have the discretion to 
5 J terminate all of your parental rights, title and interest to 
6 J all the children, do you understand that? 
7 MS. DeLONG: Yes, I do. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. All of the parties have agreed, 
9 although I have to tell you that they've done it reluctantly 
10 for one reason or another, have agreed to this matter 
11 continuing for an additional 60 days. I was a little concerned 
12 that you had been in jail for a long time. I was impressed 
13 with the classes that you took. I was glad that you did that. 
14 Sometimes people in jail take classes because there's nothing 
15 else to do, better than sitting in your cell. Sometimes people 
16 take them because it helps them get out of jail. The judge 
17 looks favorably on people taking classes. And some mothers 
18 I take them because they really want to improve their 
19 relationship with their kids. I couldn't tell which one it was 
20 J with you because I haven't been able to see how you've done 
21 I with the kids since you've been out of jail. 
22 I I am impressed that you've always been in court very 
23 I early. You've arrived here about an hour early today I 
24 J noticed. You've been very appropriate in court. You've been 
25 J very attentive to everything that's been said. You've 
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cooperated with your attorney. You've answered all of the 
questions. So I want you to have this additional time. But 
it's going to be a real tight service plan. Do you understand 
that it will be a tight service plan? 
MS. DeLONG: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: Okay. Any disobedience to the service 
plan, any disobedience, any mistakes, failing to follow my 
order in any way, any of that could result either in 
Ms. McDonald, who is the attorney for the children, or 
Miss Page, who is the attorney for the State, filing a motion 
and in that motion they just have to show mom didn't do this 
paragraph of the service plan. And if they show that, I would 
have the right then to accept your admission and terminate your 
parental rights. So is it important for you to follow the 
service plan? 
MS. DeLONG: Yes, it is. 
THE COURT: Why? 
MS. DeLONG: Not only for myself, but for my family. 
THE COURT: And what will happen if you don't follow 
the service plan? 
MS. DeLONG: I will lose my family. 
THE COURT: For how long? 
MS. DeLONG: For the rest of my life. 
THE COURT: And you don't want to do that, do you? 
MS. DeLONG: No. 
1 THE COURT: I don't want that to happen either. I 
2 I want you and the kids to be together. I want them to get over 
3 their problems and I want you to be able to improve your 
4 parenting skills so that this never comes back to haunt you 
5 again. But it is important that you understand that there 
6 wonf t be another trial, there won't be another review of all 
7 I the evidence. All there will be is either a successful return 
8 of the kids or a ruling on a motion for a failure to comply 
9 with the service plan, the new service plan, okay? 
10 MS. DeLONG: Okay. 
11 THE COURT: The restraining order remains in effect. 
12 That means that you are, at least for right now, you are not 
13 allowed to have any contact with the kids. Do you understand? 
14 MS. DeLONG: Yes, I do. 
15 THE COURT: Supposing you start making phone calls to 
16 hospitals or therapists or schools or foster families, what do 
17 you think I would do? 
18 MS. DeLONG: Terminate right then. 
19 THE COURT: Yeah. You understand that? 
20 MS. DeLONG: Uh-huh. 
21 THE COURT: Supposing you started missing therapy, 
22 I what would happen? 
23 MS. DeLONG: Terminate. 
24 THE COURT: Thatfs right. Or if you lost your job, 
25 J or if you lost your apartment, or if you started using drugs, 
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or heaven forbid if you allowed yourself to get hooked up with 
another man who was mean to you, all of those could be a basis 
for termination of parental rights, couldn't they? 
MS. DeLONG: Yes, it could. 
THE COURT: The other one, this is a little more 
difficult, I have a lot of people that go to therapy, sometimes 
they don't make progress in therapy. Some people go because 
they are ordered to go. I'm supposed to go every Wednesday 
from 2:00 to 3:00, so they see their therapist every Wednesday 
from 2:00 to 3:00, that isn't success. Success will require 
for you to understand what the therapist is saying and to 
incorporate that into your life and to use that in terms of 
communicating and raising your children. So another basis for 
termination of parental rights would be if you were not making 
progress, significant progress over the next 60 days in 
therapy. I'd like to go out longer but the law won't permit 
me. I wish I could go 90 days or 180 days so that you would 
have that much time, but the law doesn't permit me to do that. 
The legislature has said you only have a short period of time 
to give these kids permanency. So it's very important that you 
make every one of your therapy appointments unless you are just 
dieing of a disease, then you would have to have a doctor's 
excuse, okay? 
MS. DeLONG: Right. 
THE COURT: Every one of your therapy appointments, 
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right? 
MS. DeLONG: Right. 
THE COURT: And then learn it and take it in and 
understand it so that you can demonstrate it later if and when 
you start seeing your children. Will you do that? 
MS. DeLONG: I will. 
THE COURT: You are to have no contact with the 
children, no phone calls, none to their schools, their 
hospitals, no direct or indirect contact of any way until you 
have the permission of the Court, that's me, okay? 
MS. DeLONG: I understand. 
THE COURT: Okay. I want you to be gainfully 
employed. I want you to do individual therapy. And then the 
social worker and the therapist can decide if any additional 
classes beyond that are needed. 
She's taken a bunch already, but if you think those 
are necessary, we'll build those into the service plan. 
MS. McDONALD: Your Honor, I think an additional 
portion of the service plan that Miss DeLong might want to be 
aware of, it's always been part of the service plan, I don't 
think it's ever been completed, is a medical evaluation for a 
psychotropic drug that may — 
THE COURT: Will you go see a doctor — in fact, I 
think what I'm going to do is ask the Division to help her get 
set up. I'm not sure she'll know how to go about doing this. 
1 I Will you help her get set up, go through the phone book, find 
2 someone that takes the insurance or Medicaid that she has and 
3 J get her set up with an appropriate psychiatrist who can decide 
4 I whether or not medications are needed, 
5 J If they are needed, I would expect you to take them. 
6 I If title doctor says they're not needed, then you don't need to 
7 J worry about it. But you have to do what the doctor says to do. 
8 Will you do that? 
9 MS. DeLONG: I will. 
10 THE COURT: I need the Division to actually help her 
11 with that, though. 
12 MS. ZAHN: Do you mean the form of payment or just in 
13 the form of hooking her up. 
14 THE COURT: Let's start with hooking her up first, to 
15 get her the right person. If there is an issue of payment, 
16 since this is a termination proceeding I would even expect the 
17 J Division to at least initiate and help in that area as well. 
18 I'm hoping through her employment she'll have insurance, if not 
19 I'm hoping Medicaid will assist or that Valley Mental Health 
20 will be there to provide some assistance. I don't want 
21 anything administrative to be a barrier to a legitimate need. 
22 MS. McDONALD: And, your Honor, there may be 
23 additional requirements of the service plan, those will all 
24 become part of the Court order; is that correct? For example, 
25 there were things such as random UA's contained in her old 
1 service plan, I think thatfs still — 
2 THE COURT: Let's address that right now. There's 
3 I very excellent insight. You can't use any drugs. 
4 MS. DeLONG: I understand. 
5 THE COURT: And you won't do it, will you? 
6 MS. DeLONG: No, I won't. 
7 J THE COURT: Right now I don't want you using alcohol 
8 J either. I need you to be fresh and focused, okay? 
9 MS. DeLONG: Okay. 
10 THE COURT: What did I miss, Mollie? Did you suggest 
11 I something else? 
12 J MR. ANGLEY: Your Honor, there was one other thing we 
13 I discussed and I discussed with my client already as far as who 
14 the therapist will be. That as we all know she currently has 
15 started in Cornerstone, but that will not be the appropriate 
16 J therapist. 
17 J THE COURT: I use Cornerstone for drug issues, I 
18 I don't use them for these kinds of matters. They're good. The 
19 therapist has to be somebody who is approved by Ms. McDonald 
20 I and Ms. Page. They know lots of good therapists. Once again, 
21 J the Division has the affirmative responsibility to pick out and 
22 I select and get approval of these two attorneys for a particular 
23 J therapist. Sit down with her, make a phone call, get her in 
24 J for her first appointment. I don't want you just to give her a 
25 I list, I want her to have some hand holding to get her in for 
1 that first appointment. 
2 I MS. McDONALD: And finally, your Honor, just a point 
3 of clarification for Ms. DeLong's benefit. I don't want you to 
4 have the impression that your kids would be coming home after 
5 60 days. It would be wonderful if you complied with 
6 everything, but there would still be some work the kids would 
7 need to do before they would come home. 
8 MS. DeLONG: I understand that. 
9 MS. McDONALD: Okay, thanks. 
10 THE COURT: The other thing, Ms. DeLong, that you 
11 probably need to know, we're telling you lots of stuff today, 
12 these are really cute kids. 
13 MS. DeLONG: Thank you. 
14 THE COURT: Phillip is a doll, isn't he? 
15 MS. DeLONG: He is, he's my — I call him my cuddle 
16 bug. 
17 THE COURT: He's a cute little boy. The girls are 
18 cute too. The older girl is probably going to be out on her 
19 own, she'll be 18 soon. 
20 MS. DeLONG: Sara is very intelligent and I expect 
21 her to have a very successful life, 
22 THE COURT: Taylor is very sick. He's been just a 
23 little bit sick. Taylor is very sick. 
24 MS. DeLONG: I realize that. 
25 THE COURT: I think a part of it has to do with his 
1 history, I think a part of it has to do with the domestic 
2 violence that he observed and the insecurity that came into his 
3 heart when he saw his mom and his dad having those kinds of 
4 hard fights. I think a part of it has to do with when he was 
5 put into foster care and moved from a familiar environment into 
6 a foster environment. All of those things contribute to create 
7 some real problems. But right now he's a very sick little boy. 
8 It's going to take us a long time to get him stabilized and 
9 we'll need your help to do that. 
10 MS. DeLONG: I'll do whatever I can. 
11 THE COURT: He just needs to know that he's safe and 
12 that he!s loved and that that kind of violence will never 
13 repeat itself. 
14 MS. DeLONG: That's my goal. I don't ever want to do 
15 that. 
16 THE COURT: Ms. McDonald, anything further? 
17 MS. McDONALD: No, your Honor, I'm just — will the 
18 service plan become part of the Court order once the Division 
19 drafts it? 
20 THE COURT: Yes. 
21 MS. McDONALD: Okay, thank you. 
22 MR. ANGLEY: And, your Honor, can we have a time 
23 frame for when that service plan will be put in place on the 
24 record? 
25 THE COURT: I'm looking to whatever you — 
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only so much that one person who is not making a great deal 
of money, there's only so much a person can do in a certain 
period of time. 
You know, she hasn't relapsed into poor 
relationships. She hasn't relapsed into any kind of alcohol 
use. She hasn't pursued anything vis-a-vis drug use, 
illegal drug use, overuse of prescription drugs. She's not 
falling in with the wrong crowd. She's staying away from 
any involvement with actions and activities that would 
involved her with law enforcement. She's trying to do the 
right things. 
There's something that we call crawl, walk and 
run. And, Your Honor, I'm simply asking this Court to allow 
my client to continue on the service plan. Thank you. 
THE COURT: The concern that the Court had during 
the prior adjudication was not so much the best interest as 
•17 J it pertains to the children as it was the fact that the 
mother had only been in jail for a short period of time and 
I wasn't sure that she'd had a fair shot at being able to 
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20 comply with the service plan. 
The Court found previously that, as contained in 
its order and the minute entry that were entered after t h e — 
after the last adjudication, and I want to say that was back 
in August. Was that back in August? 
MS. PAGE: It was, Your Honor. 
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MR. BARRON: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: That none of the children wanted to go 
home at that point. There were some concerns about the 
ultimate placements, but none of the children expressed to 
the Court a desire to return home under the current 
circumstances, with the mother functioning the way that she 
was. 
And the Courtf s concern was that the mother had 
not been out of jail for a substantial period of time and 
was not sure that she'd had the opportunity of demonstrating 
that she could resolve the underlying emotional problems. 
The children, the Court found, had been abused physically, 
had been abused emotionally, and were in a very sad and very 
deplorable and neglectful condition, in terms of their 
anxieties and their emotional stress. 
The Court also found that the children had thrived 
in foster care. There's no evidence today to the contrary, 
18 I that that -- that any of those underlying facts have 
19 J changed. 
The Court finds that the guardian ad litem has 
demonstrated her motion by clear and convincing evidence. 
Although this matter was only supposed to go for 60 days, 
all parties agreed that it would go for 60 days, it has in 
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24 fact gone for twice that amount of time. 
25 After hearing all of the evidence that was 
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presented, the mother did enter her admission to the 
petition and indicate that those facts were true and 
correct. Because of the concerns for the short amount of 
time that she had to demonstrate her compliance with the 
service plan, this matter was continued. 
But the Court finds that the mother has failed to 
stand up to her part of the bargain. She's failed to take 
the urinalysis, as required in my order that was issued and 
verbally, as she was instructed from the bench, that she was 
to phone in and take those UA's on a regular basis. The 
Court finds that she's only taken two to three of those, 
albeit she has sufficient knowledge as to how to take the 
UAfs and was prompted to do so by the Division of Child & 
Family Services. 
The Court finds also that the mother's failed to 
do the individual counseling. The Court was very concerned 
that Ms. Delong had a very concrete way of thinking, was not 
sympathetic to the needs of the children, and that the 
individual counseling was absolutely essential to avoid 
further emotional neglect, physical abuse and becoming 
involved with people that were harmful to her and to her 
children. 
The evidence has demonstrated that the mother has 
only had a couple of sessions of individual counseling, and 
it's uncontested that she has not been invited back and is 
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not re-engaged in additional counseling. She has a number 
of explanations and excuses for that, but that has been the 
history of this case, non-compliance and excuses. 
Mother was ordered to have no contact with the 
therapists for the children. It appears that she did 
contact Ms. Berry. It does not appear that she was prompted 
to do so by her own individual therapist. It would be 
unprecedented, this Court thinks, for those therapists to 
request her to engage in that kind of behavior. The Court 
knows that therapists speak amongst themselves. Therapists 
also involve the Division of Child & Family Services. It 
would be unprecedented to involve a parent in this kind of a 
circumstance and have the parent initiate that kind of 
contact and try to set up the kind of family therapy, which 
I know the mother has wanted but has been inconsistent with 
individual therapy. 
There is inadequate evidence to demonstrate that 
she's capable of paying the rent and to provide for the 
basic necessities of the children economically. It doesn't 
appear that she can meet those needs in terms of providing 
food, transportation and necessities for the children, the 
rent, as well as continue in the counseling. 
The Court does not find that there has been any 
significant progress on the service plan. 
Court therefore accepts the mother's admission, 
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finds that the mother has not complied with the stipulated 
arrangement. The Court finds that the petition is true and 
correct that was originally filed by the Division of Child & 
Family Services, and any right, title and interest that the 
mother has and into Sara Hartwell, Rebecca Delong, Taylor 
Delong or Phillip Delong should be and hereby are fully and 
completely terminated, including residual parental rights. 
I'll ask the guardian ad litem to prepare a fact-
9 specific order. 
MS. McDONALD: I will, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: We're in adjournment. Thank you. 
MS. PAGE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Whereupon, at the hour of 11:08 a.m., 
the proceedings were concluded.) 
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